当前位置: X-MOL 学术Philos. Phenomenol. Res. › 论文详情
Our official English website, www.x-mol.net, welcomes your feedback! (Note: you will need to create a separate account there.)
Against anti‐fanaticism
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research ( IF 1.3 ) Pub Date : 2024-11-18 , DOI: 10.1111/phpr.13120
Christian Tarsney

Should you be willing to forego any sure good for a tiny probability of a vastly greater good? Fanatics say you should, anti‐fanatics say you should not. Anti‐fanaticism has great intuitive appeal. But, I argue, these intuitions are untenable, because satisfying them in their full generality is incompatible with three very plausible principles: acyclicity, a minimal dominance principle, and the principle that any outcome can be made better or worse. This argument against anti‐fanaticism can be turned into a positive argument for a weak version of fanaticism, but only from significantly more contentious premises. In combination, these facts suggest that those who find fanaticism counterintuitive should favor not anti‐fanaticism, but an intermediate position that permits agents to have incomplete preferences that are neither fanatical nor anti‐fanatical.

中文翻译:

 反对反狂热主义


你是否应该愿意放弃任何确定的利益,以换取一个大得多的利益的微小可能性?狂热分子说你应该,反狂热分子说你不应该。反狂热主义具有极大的直觉吸引力。但是,我认为,这些直觉是站不住脚的,因为满足它们的完全普遍性与三个非常合理的原则不相容:无周期性、最小支配原则以及任何结果都可以变得更好或更坏的原则。这种反对反狂热主义的论点可以转化为对狂热主义的弱版本的积极论点,但只能来自明显更具争议的前提。综上所述,这些事实表明,那些认为狂热有悖常理的人不应该偏爱反狂热主义,而应该偏爱一个中间立场,允许代理人拥有既不狂热也不反狂热的不完整偏好。
更新日期:2024-11-18
down
wechat
bug