This study provides new evidence for the regulatory impact of informality on gasoline efficiency in Africa. I propose a Two-Part Complementary Hypothesis (hereafter referred to as the TPCH test), advocating a differential approach to promoting gasoline efficiency: (1) an inverted U-shaped relationship between informality and gasoline inefficiency, and (2) a U-shaped relationship between government regulation and informality, with a significant level effect. The findings indicate an inverted U-shaped effect of informality on gasoline efficiency and a level-negative effect of regulation on informality. These results suggest a differential strategy for enhancing gasoline efficiency. Government regulation is more effective in economies at the pre-saturation stage (characterized by normal growth levels of informality) but proves ineffective in economies at the post-saturation stage (characterized by abnormal growth levels of informality), where energy-saving behaviors may be self-motivated. This is corroborated by the inefficiency equation, where indicators of good governance, such as the rule of law, control of corruption, and regulatory quality, are statistically significant in advancing energy efficiency goals. Gasoline efficiency performance varies across countries, with the higher performers also being the continent's most economically advanced. However, these estimates risk downward bias if outliers or unobserved/observed heterogeneity are not considered.

中文翻译：

---

非正规性对非洲汽油消费效率的监管影响：拟议的两部分互补假设检验


本研究为非正规性对非洲汽油效率的监管影响提供了新证据。我提出了一个两部分互补假设（以下简称 TPCH 检验），倡导采用差异化方法来提高汽油效率：（1） 非正规性与汽油低效率之间的倒 U 形关系，以及 （2） 政府监管与非正规性之间的 U 形关系，具有显着的水平效应。研究结果表明，非正规性对汽油效率的影响呈倒 U 形，而监管对非正规性的影响呈水平负效应。这些结果表明了提高汽油效率的差异化策略。政府监管在处于饱和前阶段（以非正规性正常增长水平为特征）的经济体中更有效，但在后饱和阶段（以非正规性异常增长水平为特征）的经济体被证明无效，在这些经济体中，节能行为可能是自我激励的。低效率方程式证实了这一点，其中法治、腐败控制和监管质量等善治指标在推进能源效率目标方面具有统计学意义。汽油效率表现因国家/地区而异，表现较高的国家也是非洲大陆经济最先进的国家。然而，如果不考虑异常值或未观察到/观察到的异质性，这些估计值存在向下偏倚的风险。