In current remanufacturing supply chains, whether the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) independently engages in remanufacturing or delegating (authorizing or outsourcing) to a third-party remanufacturer (TPR) is influenced by the government's differentiated carbon tax. However, our understanding of the factors influencing the optimal choice among the three remanufacturing strategies (i.e., self-remanufacturing, authorizing remanufacturing, and outsourcing remanufacturing) is fairly limited. In particular, little attention has been paid to differentiated carbon taxes, which involve the government imposing a high carbon tax on new products and a low carbon tax on remanufactured products. To fill these gaps, this study develops game models that include an OEM and a TPR. Our analysis reveals four main findings. First, with the increase in carbon tax on new products, the price of both new and remanufactured products rises. By contrast, once the carbon tax on remanufactured products increases, only the price of remanufactured products rises. Second, when the carbon tax gap between new and remanufactured products is small and the ratio of environmental impact per unit of remanufactured products to that of new products is less than consumer preference, both outsourcing remanufacturing and self-remanufacturing could achieve a win-win situation in reducing environmental impact and enhancing consumer surplus. Third, regardless of the governments' setting of the differentiated carbon tax, the OEM, as a profit-seeker, will decline the authorizing remanufacturing to expand profits in any case. Further, when the carbon tax gap between new and remanufactured products is less than a certain threshold, the optimal mode for the OEM is outsourcing remanufacturing, followed by self-remanufacturing. Fourth, our numerical analysis indicates that the carbon tax gap between new and remanufactured products plays a vital role in optimal remanufacturing strategy selection. Notably, both the recycling scale of wasted products and consumer preferences for remanufactured products should be taken into account when making an optimal remanufacturing selection.

中文翻译：

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差异化碳税对再制造模式选择的影响


在当前的再制造供应链中，原始设备制造商 （OEM） 是独立从事再制造还是委托（授权或外包）给第三方再制造商 （TPR） 受到政府差异化碳税的影响。然而，我们对影响三种再制造策略（即自我再制造、授权再制造和外包再制造）中最佳选择的因素的理解相当有限。特别是，很少有人关注差异化碳税，其中包括政府对新产品征收高碳税，对再制造产品征收低碳税。为了填补这些空白，本研究开发了包括 OEM 和 TPR 的游戏模型。我们的分析揭示了四个主要发现。首先，随着新产品碳税的增加，新产品和再制造产品的价格都会上涨。相比之下，一旦再制造产品的碳税增加，只有再制造产品的价格会上涨。其次，当新产品和再制造产品之间的碳税差距较小，并且每单位再制造产品与新产品的环境影响比小于消费者偏好时，外包再制造和自我再制造都可以在减少环境影响和提高消费者剩余方面实现双赢。第三，无论政府如何设置差异化碳税，OEM 作为逐利者，无论如何都会拒绝授权再制造以扩大利润。 此外，当新产品和再制造产品之间的碳税差距小于某个阈值时，OEM 的最佳模式是外包再制造，然后是自我再制造。第四，我们的数值分析表明，新产品和再制造产品之间的碳税差距在最佳再制造战略选择中起着至关重要的作用。值得注意的是，在做出最佳再制造选择时，应考虑废弃产品的回收规模和消费者对再制造产品的偏好。