We consider a content market with an ad-supported content platform and a representative producer in the presence of altruistic consumers. The platform may launch different subsidy policies (i.e., a monetary subsidy based on the content demand that directly improves marginal profit or a traffic subsidy that directly improves content quality), and the producer creates content under two pricing strategies (i.e., a fixed pricing strategy and a pay-as-you-wish strategy where consumer can pay for the content as they wish). We develop a stylized model and investigate which subsidy policy is a better choice for the platform when the producer is delegated pricing power. Under a fixed pricing strategy, the platform gets a higher profit in the traffic subsidy policy when the consumers’ basic utility is not too low or the quality cost is small, while the producer gets a higher profit in the traffic subsidy when consumers’ basic utility is high or the quality cost is small. Hence, both subsidy policies can achieve the “win-win” situation under certain conditions. Under the pay-as-you-wish strategy, the platform always gets a higher profit in the traffic subsidy policy, while the producer gets a higher profit in the traffic subsidy policy when the consumers’ basic utility for content is high. Hence, only the traffic subsidy policy can achieve the “win-win” situation under certain conditions. Due to the tradeoff between the subsidy enhancement effect on quality and the quality cost, we observe that although the traffic subsidy policy brings a higher content quality than the monetary subsidy policy under both pricing strategies, the producer can increase or decrease his content quality in the traffic subsidy policy compared with the monetary subsidy policy. Our paper provides guidance on how content platforms can provide the right subsidy policy to the producer.

中文翻译：

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广告支持内容平台补贴政策的战略分析：生产商定价策略的观点


我们考虑一个内容市场，该市场具有广告支持的内容平台和在场的无私消费者的代表性生产者。平台可以推出不同的补贴政策（即直接提高边际利润的基于内容需求的货币补贴或直接提高内容质量的流量补贴），生产者根据两种定价策略（即固定定价策略和消费者可以随心所欲地为内容付费的付费策略）创建内容。我们开发了一个程式化的模型，并研究了当生产者被授予定价权时，哪种补贴政策对平台来说是更好的选择。在固定定价策略下，当消费者基本效用不太低或质量成本较低时，平台在流量补贴政策中获得较高的利润，而当消费者基本效用较高或质量成本较低时，生产者在流量补贴政策中获得较高的利润。因此，两种补贴政策在一定条件下都能达到“双赢”的局面。在按量付费策略下，当消费者对内容的基本效用较高时，平台在流量补贴政策中始终获得更高的利润，而生产者在流量补贴政策中获得更高的利润。因此，只有交通补贴政策才能在一定条件下实现“双赢”的局面。由于补贴增强对质量的影响与质量成本之间的权衡，我们观察到，尽管在两种定价策略量补贴政策都带来了比货币补贴政策更高的内容质量，但与货币补贴政策相比，生产者可以在流量补贴政策中提高或降低其内容质量。 我们的论文就内容平台如何为制作者提供正确的补贴政策提供了指导。