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Avoidance of altruistic punishment: Testing with a situation-selective third-party punishment game
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology ( IF 3.2 ) Pub Date : 2024-11-02 , DOI: 10.1016/j.jesp.2024.104695 Kodai Mitsuishi, Yuta Kawamura
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology ( IF 3.2 ) Pub Date : 2024-11-02 , DOI: 10.1016/j.jesp.2024.104695 Kodai Mitsuishi, Yuta Kawamura
Third-party punishment games have consistently shown that people are willing to bear personal costs to punish others who act selfishly, even as uninvolved observers. However, the traditional third-party punishment game places participants in contrived situations that mandate direct punishment decisions, potentially inflating the prevalence of such actions compared to those observed in more naturalistic settings. In light of this obligatory nature, one might speculate that if given the autonomy to step aside, people could be inclined to forgo punishment rather than penalize unfairness. The present study developed the Situation-Selective Third-Party Punishment Game (SS-TPPG), an experimental paradigm, to investigate whether avoidance of witnessing unfairness stems from a reluctance to make punitive decisions or a desire to avoid observing unfairness altogether. Three studies (total N = 810) consistently revealed that avoidance was driven by both a reluctance to witness unfair treatment and an aversion to administering punishments. Notably, participants who typically avoided observing unfair treatment were inclined to punish when forced to observe it. Furthermore, when given the opportunity to punish indirectly, participants were less likely to avoid observing unfair distributions. These results suggest that the elevated instances of direct punishment noted in the traditional third-party punishment game might be reflective of the game's structure, which constrains participants' ability to avoid witnessing unfair distributions.
中文翻译:
避免利他主义惩罚:使用情境选择性第三方惩罚游戏进行测试
第三方惩罚游戏一直表明,人们愿意承担个人成本来惩罚那些自私行事的人,即使他们是不参与其中的旁观者。然而,传统的第三方惩罚游戏将参与者置于要求直接惩罚决定的人为情境中,与在更自然的环境中观察到的行为相比,这可能会夸大此类行为的普遍性。鉴于这种强制性,人们可能会推测,如果赋予退居二线的自主权,人们可能会倾向于放弃惩罚而不是惩罚不公平。本研究开发了情境选择性第三方惩罚游戏 (SS-TPPG),这是一种实验范式,旨在调查避免目睹不公平是源于不愿意做出惩罚性决定还是希望完全避免观察不公平。三项研究 (总 N = 810) 一致表明,回避是由于不愿意目睹不公平的待遇和厌恶实施惩罚。值得注意的是,通常避免观察不公平待遇的参与者在被迫观察不公平待遇时倾向于惩罚。此外,当有机会间接惩罚时,参与者不太可能避免观察到不公平的分配。这些结果表明,在传统的第三方惩罚游戏中注意到的直接惩罚实例增加可能反映了游戏的结构,这限制了参与者避免目睹不公平分配的能力。
更新日期:2024-11-02
中文翻译:
避免利他主义惩罚:使用情境选择性第三方惩罚游戏进行测试
第三方惩罚游戏一直表明,人们愿意承担个人成本来惩罚那些自私行事的人,即使他们是不参与其中的旁观者。然而,传统的第三方惩罚游戏将参与者置于要求直接惩罚决定的人为情境中,与在更自然的环境中观察到的行为相比,这可能会夸大此类行为的普遍性。鉴于这种强制性,人们可能会推测,如果赋予退居二线的自主权,人们可能会倾向于放弃惩罚而不是惩罚不公平。本研究开发了情境选择性第三方惩罚游戏 (SS-TPPG),这是一种实验范式,旨在调查避免目睹不公平是源于不愿意做出惩罚性决定还是希望完全避免观察不公平。三项研究 (总 N = 810) 一致表明,回避是由于不愿意目睹不公平的待遇和厌恶实施惩罚。值得注意的是,通常避免观察不公平待遇的参与者在被迫观察不公平待遇时倾向于惩罚。此外,当有机会间接惩罚时,参与者不太可能避免观察到不公平的分配。这些结果表明,在传统的第三方惩罚游戏中注意到的直接惩罚实例增加可能反映了游戏的结构,这限制了参与者避免目睹不公平分配的能力。