当前位置:
X-MOL 学术
›
Journal of Legal Analysis
›
论文详情
Our official English website, www.x-mol.net, welcomes your
feedback! (Note: you will need to create a separate account there.)
The Limits of Formalism in the Separation of Powers
Journal of Legal Analysis ( IF 3.0 ) Pub Date : 2024-11-16 , DOI: 10.1093/jla/laae007 Shalev Gad Roisman
Journal of Legal Analysis ( IF 3.0 ) Pub Date : 2024-11-16 , DOI: 10.1093/jla/laae007 Shalev Gad Roisman
Formalism is the dominant mode of separation of powers analysis on the Supreme Court and one of two paradigmatic approaches in the academy. It seeks to resolve disputes between Congress and the President by asking which branch has exclusive power over the relevant matter. This method is thought to work because, if one branch has exclusive power over the matter, then, by definition, the other branch does not. Although this method is coherent and workable in some relatively straightforward cases, it is of no use in areas where both branches’ “exclusive” powers overlap—as formalists routinely concede is possible. This is a major problem because almost all the disputes that actually arise today involve areas of overlapping power. In such cases, both branches have relevant power to act and come into conflict. This Article argues that separation of powers formalism has never built—and can never build—a coherent method that tells us which branch to prioritize in such instances. These are the limits of formalism in the separation of powers. Formalism might help us understand some uncontroversial separation of powers questions, but it cannot resolve the disputes that actually matter today.
中文翻译:
形式主义在三权分立中的局限性
形式主义是最高法院三权分立分析的主要模式,也是学术界的两种范式方法之一。它试图通过询问哪个部门对相关事务拥有专属权力来解决国会和总统之间的争端。这种方法被认为是有效的,因为如果一个分支对该事务拥有排他性权力,那么根据定义,另一个分支则没有。尽管这种方法在一些相对简单的情况下是连贯且可行的,但在两个分支的“排他性”权力重叠的领域毫无用处——正如形式主义者通常承认的那样。这是一个主要问题,因为今天实际出现的几乎所有争议都涉及权力重叠的领域。在这种情况下,两个部门都有相应的权力采取行动并发生冲突。本文认为,三权分立形式主义从来没有——也永远无法——建立一个连贯的方法,告诉我们在这种情况下应该优先考虑哪个分支。这些是形式主义在权力分立中的局限性。形式主义可能有助于我们理解一些无争议的权力分立问题,但它无法解决今天真正重要的争论。
更新日期:2024-11-16
中文翻译:
形式主义在三权分立中的局限性
形式主义是最高法院三权分立分析的主要模式,也是学术界的两种范式方法之一。它试图通过询问哪个部门对相关事务拥有专属权力来解决国会和总统之间的争端。这种方法被认为是有效的,因为如果一个分支对该事务拥有排他性权力,那么根据定义,另一个分支则没有。尽管这种方法在一些相对简单的情况下是连贯且可行的,但在两个分支的“排他性”权力重叠的领域毫无用处——正如形式主义者通常承认的那样。这是一个主要问题,因为今天实际出现的几乎所有争议都涉及权力重叠的领域。在这种情况下,两个部门都有相应的权力采取行动并发生冲突。本文认为,三权分立形式主义从来没有——也永远无法——建立一个连贯的方法,告诉我们在这种情况下应该优先考虑哪个分支。这些是形式主义在权力分立中的局限性。形式主义可能有助于我们理解一些无争议的权力分立问题,但它无法解决今天真正重要的争论。