We study sequential bilateral trade where sellers and buyers valuations are completely arbitrary (i.e., determined by an adversary). Sellers and buyers are strategic agents with private valuations for the good and the goal is to design a mechanism that maximizes efficiency (or gain from trade) while being incentive compatible, individually rational and budget balanced. In this paper we consider gain from trade, which is harder to approximate than social welfare.

中文翻译：

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对抗性双边贸易的α遗憾分析


我们研究了顺序双边贸易，其中卖方和买方的估值是完全任意的（即由对手决定）。卖家和买家是战略代理人，对商品进行私人估值，目标是设计一种机制，使效率最大化（或从贸易中获得收益），同时保持激励兼容、个人理性和预算平衡。在本文中，我们考虑了贸易收益，这比社会福利更难估计。