This paper identifies market failure caused by an animal welfare externality that occurs if private animal friendliness falls short of social animal friendliness. Efficiency is restored by taxing the quantity of animal food and subsidizing the quality per unit of animal food. With consumer and producer heterogeneity, a promising policy includes mandatory quality standards. If a producer wants to be qualified as outdoor husbandry farmer, she has to fulfill an ambitious standard. As compensation, she obtains a subsidy on output, whereas factory farmers, who face a lower mandatory quality standard, still have to pay a tax on their output.

中文翻译：

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动物福利、道德消费者和动物食品生产的最佳监管


本文确定了由动物福利外部性引起的市场失灵，如果私人动物友好性低于社会性动物友好性，就会发生这种外部性。通过对动物性食品的数量征税和补贴每单位动物性食品的质量，可以恢复效率。由于消费者和生产者的异质性，一个有前途的政策包括强制性质量标准。如果生产者想获得户外畜牧业农民的资格，她必须满足一个雄心勃勃的标准。作为补偿，她获得了产出补贴，而面临较低强制性质量标准的工厂化农民仍然必须为他们的产出纳税。