My aim in this paper is to introduce and motivate a general normative framework, which I call feasibilism, and to sketch a view of the relationship between the prescriptive and the hypological in the epistemic domain by drawing on the theoretical resources provided by this framework. I then generalise the lesson to the moral domain. I begin by motivating feasibilism. A wide range of norms appear to leave uncharted an important part of the normative landscape. Across different domains we need norms more directed at the subject, and less dependent on how the world beyond our control plays out. In the beginning of this paper I briefly outline two broad ways of seeking such subject-directed norms: perspectivism and feasibilism. According to feasibilism, the ultimate reason why more objectivist norms are inadequate on their own is not that they fail to take into account the limits of an agent’s perspective, but that they are not sensitive to limits on what ways of choosing, acting, and believing are feasible in a given situation. I think of these ways of choosing, acting, and believing in terms of an agent’s dispositions. This paper focuses on a gnosticist implementation of feasibilism. Such a view supplements a knowledge norm with a norm urging one to only be in doxastic states that are manifestations of the most knowledge-conducive feasible dispositions – that is, a norm urging one to be in doxastic states that are reasonable. But how should we think about the normative statuses of knowledge versus reasonableness? By drawing on two general hypotheses about the relationship between succeeding (e.g. knowing) and manifesting dispositions conducive to success (e.g. reasonable belief), I argue for a view on which the prescriptive and the hypological come radically apart. The result is that an epistemic analogue of a thesis that many have assumed to hold in the moral realm should be rejected. This thesis is Only Blameworthy for Wrongs: we can only ever be blameworthy for acts that are morally wrong. I argue that on the picture presented, we can be epistemically blameworthy for doxastic states that do not violate any prescriptive epistemic norms. I then generalise the considerations to the moral realm, arguing against Only Blameworthy for Wrongs.

我在本文中的目的是介绍和激励一个通用的规范框架，我称之为可行性，并通过利用该框架提供的理论资源，勾勒出认识领域中规定性和伪装性之间关系的观点。然后，我将这一教训推广到道德领域。我从激励可行性开始。广泛的规范似乎使 Unchartion 成为规范景观的重要组成部分。在不同领域，我们需要更多针对主题的规范，而不是依赖于我们无法控制的世界如何发展。在本文的开头，我简要概述了寻求这种主题导向规范的两种广泛方式：透视主义和可行性论。根据可行性论，更多的客观主义规范本身不足的最终原因不是它们没有考虑到代理人视角的局限性，而是它们对在特定情况下选择、行动和相信的方式是可行的限制不敏感。我从代理人的性格的角度来思考这些选择、行动和信仰的方式。本文重点介绍了诺斯替主义对可行性论的实施。这种观点用一种规范来补充知识规范，敦促一个人只处于最有利于知识的可行倾向的表现形式——也就是说，一种敦促一个人处于合理的 doxastic 状态的规范。但是我们应该如何看待知识与合理性的规范地位呢？通过借鉴关于成功（例如知道）和表现出有利于成功的倾向（例如 合理的信念），我主张一种规定性和伪善完全不同的观点。其结果是，许多人认为在道德领域中持有的论点的认识类比应该被拒绝。这个论点是 Only Blameworth for Wrongs：我们只能为道德上错误的行为而受到指责。我认为，根据所呈现的图景，我们可以在认识论上为不违反任何规定性认识规范的 doxastic 状态而受到指责。然后，我将这些考虑推广到道德领域，反对 Only Blameworthy for Wrongs。