We develop a game-theoretic model of strategic interdependence and tipping in public policy choices and show that the model can be estimated by probit and logit estimators. We test its validity and applicability by using daily data on state-level COVID-19 responses in the United States. Social distancing via shelter-in-place (SIP) strategies and wearing masks emerged as the most effective nonpharmaceutical ways of combatting COVID-19. In the United States, choices about these policies are made by individual states. We develop a game-theoretic model of such choices and test it econometrically, confirming strong interdependence in the implementation of these policies. If enough states engage in social distancing or mask wearing, others will be tipped to follow suit. Policy choices are influenced mainly by the choices of other states, especially those of similar political orientation and to a lesser degree by the number of new COVID-19 cases. The choice of mask-wearing policies is more sensitive to peer choices than the choice of SIP policies, and Republican states are much less likely than Democratic to introduce mask-wearing policies. The choices of policies are influenced more by political than public health considerations. These findings emphasize strategic interdependence in policy choice and offer an analytical framework for these complex dynamics.

中文翻译：

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在公共政策实施中建模和测试战略相互依存关系和倾销


我们开发了一个公共政策选择中的战略相互依存和倾销的博弈论模型，并表明该模型可以通过 probit 和 logit 估计器进行估计。我们通过使用美国各州级 COVID-19 响应的每日数据来测试其有效性和适用性。通过就地避难 （SIP） 策略保持社交距离和戴口罩成为对抗 COVID-19 的最有效非药物方法。在美国，这些政策的选择由各个州做出。我们开发了此类选择的博弈论模型，并对其进行了计量经济学测试，证实了这些政策实施中的强烈相互依存性。如果有足够多的州保持社交距离或戴口罩，其他州将倾向于效仿。政策选择主要受其他州的选择影响，尤其是那些具有相似政治取向的州，在较小程度上受 COVID-19 新病例数量的影响。戴口罩政策的选择比 SIP 政策的选择对同行的选择更敏感，共和党各州出台戴口罩政策的可能性远低于民主党。政策选择更多地受到政治考虑而非公共卫生考虑的影响。这些发现强调了政策选择中的战略相互依存关系，并为这些复杂的动态提供了分析框架。