This paper investigates two fundamental questions related to safety and insurance in the age of automation. First, we touch upon the question of safety and liability under infrastructure-assisted automated driving. In such an environment, automakers provide vehicle automation technology while infrastructure support service providers (ISSPs) provide smart infrastructure services. Additionally, customers can receive coverage for accidents from either of these actors but also from legacy auto insurers. We investigate the effect of market structure on safety and accident coverage and show that an integrated monopoly provides full coverage and fully accounts for accident costs when choosing safety levels. However, in the Nash setting, even though full coverage obtains, lack of coordination leads to partial internalization of accident costs by the automaker. Moreover, multiple equilibria might exist, some of them undesirable. We show that, both in the presence and absence of legacy insurance, an appropriate liability rule can induce optimal safety levels under the Nash setting. Our second question concerns itself with the role and welfare effects of the availability of legacy auto insurance in the age of infrastructure-assisted automated driving. Our analysis shows that the industry is not necessary for optimal coverage when the cost of accidents is known in advance and all possible accident scenarios are contractible. In fact, their presence can even harm safety, even though it ensures full coverage for accidents. When only insurance contracts with capped liability for automakers and ISSPs are available and in a monopolistic environment, legacy insurance potentially harms welfare. This highlights the important role of market structure in assessing the future of insurance in the age of automated driving and lays the groundwork for future investigations in this direction.

中文翻译：

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自动驾驶时代的安全、责任和保险市场


本文探讨了自动化时代与安全和保险相关的两个基本问题。首先，我们讨论了基础设施辅助自动驾驶下的安全和责任问题。在这样的环境中，汽车制造商提供车辆自动化技术，而基础设施支持服务提供商 （ISSP） 提供智能基础设施服务。此外，客户可以从这些参与者中的任何一个那里获得事故保险，也可以从传统的汽车保险公司那里获得保险。我们调查了市场结构对安全和事故覆盖范围的影响，并表明在选择安全级别时，综合垄断提供了完全覆盖并充分考虑了事故成本。然而，在 Nash 环境中，即使获得了完全覆盖，但缺乏协调也会导致汽车制造商部分内部化事故成本。此外，可能存在多重均衡，其中一些是不可取的。我们表明，在存在和不存在遗留保险的情况下，适当的责任规则都可以在 Nash 设置下诱导最佳安全水平。我们的第二个问题涉及在基础设施辅助自动驾驶时代，传统汽车保险的作用和福利影响。我们的分析表明，当事故成本事先已知并且所有可能的事故情况都是可合同的时，该行业就不需要最佳保险。事实上，它们的存在甚至会损害安全，即使它可以确保事故的全面覆盖。当只有汽车制造商和 ISSP 的责任上限保险合同可用并且处于垄断环境中时，遗留保险可能会损害福利。 这凸显了市场结构在评估自动驾驶时代保险未来方面的重要作用，并为未来朝这个方向的研究奠定了基础。