Trade-in and resale programs are increasingly adopted by retail platforms, boosting sales and generating additional profits through the resale of used products. Consequently, manufacturers selling new products on these platforms should re-evaluate their selling strategies (wholesale or agency). We construct a game-theoretic model to examine when a retail platform should introduce trade-in and resale programs and how a manufacturer should select selling strategy in response. Results indicate that under the wholesale strategy, the introduction of the trade-in and resale program always benefits the retail platform but hurts the manufacturer. However, under the agency strategy, it may positively impact both the retail platform and the manufacturer. Notably, regardless of whether the trade-in and resale program is introduced, the manufacturer should opt for the wholesale strategy if the production cost is high; otherwise, the agency strategy is preferable. Furthermore, after introducing the trade-in and resale program, the manufacturer exhibits a greater inclination towards opting for the agency strategy. This study provides valuable guidance for manufacturers and retail platforms in choosing selling strategies and implementing trade-in and resale programs.

中文翻译：

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平台供应链中的以旧换新和转售： 制造商选择的销售策略


零售平台越来越多地采用以旧换新和转售计划，通过转售二手产品来促进销售并产生额外利润。因此，在这些平台上销售新产品的制造商应重新评估其销售策略（批发或代理）。我们构建了一个博弈论模型来研究零售平台何时应该引入以旧换新和转售计划，以及制造商应该如何选择销售策略作为回应。结果表明，在批发策略下，以旧换新和转售计划的引入总是有利于零售平台，但对制造商不利。但是，根据代理策略，它可能会对零售平台和制造商产生积极影响。值得注意的是，无论是否引入以旧换新和转售计划，如果生产成本高，制造商都应该选择批发策略;否则，代理策略更可取。此外，在引入以旧换新和转售计划后，制造商表现出更倾向于选择代理策略。本研究为制造商和零售平台选择销售策略以及实施以旧换新和转售计划提供了有价值的指导。