This study investigates the disclosure strategies for quality information in a dual-channel supply chain comprising a manufacturer and a dual-purpose online platform focusing on both profit and consumer surplus. We elaborate on two disclosure formats: the P-C format, in which the platform discloses quality information, and the M-C format, in which the manufacturer discloses quality information. The results show that firms have the same disclosure motivation when the platform pursues profit maximization because only the agency channel is retained in the supply chain, and firms share profits equally. However, the indistinguishable disclosure incentive for firms exhibits a convex relationship with the consumer surplus concern in the dual-purpose case. In addition, the M-C or P-C format is the optimal disclosure preference for firms, indicating that hitchhiking may not always be the best option. Specifically, the manufacturer (platform) will proactively disclose information in regions where the commission rate is low (high) and the consumer surplus concern is not too high. Firms in these areas have common preferences regarding different disclosure formats. Also, consumers do not necessarily benefit from the increased consumer surplus concern under the P-C format. Finally, the outcomes are robust to the scenarios with a parsimonious dual-purpose platform, ex-post disclosure, quality certification, and imperfect competition market.

中文翻译：

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在线两用平台的双渠道供应链中的质量披露


本研究调查了由制造商和专注于利润和消费者剩余双重用途的在线平台组成的双渠道供应链中质量信息的披露策略。我们详细阐述了两种披露格式：P-C 格式（平台披露质量信息）和 M-C 格式（制造商披露质量信息）。结果表明，当平台追求利润最大化时，企业具有相同的披露动机，因为供应链中只保留了代理渠道，企业平分利润。然而，在双重目的的情况下，对公司的披露激励与消费者剩余关注表现出凸关系。此外，M-C 或 P-C 格式是公司的最佳披露偏好，这表明搭便车可能并不总是最佳选择。具体来说，制造商（平台）会在佣金率低（高）且消费者剩余关注度不太高的地区主动披露信息。这些领域的公司对不同的披露格式有共同的偏好。此外，在 P-C 格式下，消费者不一定会从消费者剩余担忧的增加中受益。最后，结果对吝啬的两用平台、事后披露、质量认证和不完善的竞争市场等场景具有鲁棒性。