This study investigates whether the degree of cost stickiness depends on the divergence between control and cash-flow rights of ultimate owners using data from 22 countries. Firms with a large divergence between control and cash-flow rights are known to take more opportunistic actions at the expense of minority shareholders. The empirical results show that the magnitude of cost stickiness decreases as the divergence between control and cash-flow rights increases due to the greater incentives to manipulate earnings. Firms use both accruals earnings management (AEM) and real-activities earnings management (REM), and among REM, they adjust production activity and discretionary expense to affect cost. Additional tests show that the negative relationship between the divergence between control and cash-flow rights and cost stickiness is more pronounced in countries with weak economic, legal, and social factors. This paper, by examining the effect of ownership structure on cost behavior as well as its underlying mechanism, broadens the understanding of sticky cost behavior and contributes to the growing body of literature on the convergence of financial and managerial accounting.

中文翻译：

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控制权和现金流权的分歧如何影响成本粘性？


本研究使用来自 22 个国家的数据调查了成本粘性程度是否取决于最终所有者的控制权和现金流权之间的差异。众所周知，控制权和现金流权之间存在较大差异的公司会采取更多的机会主义行动，以牺牲少数股东的利益为代价。实证结果表明，由于操纵收益的动机更大，随着控制权和现金流权之间的分歧增加，成本粘性的大小会降低。公司同时使用权责发生制盈余管理 （AEM） 和实际活动盈余管理 （REM），在 REM 中，它们调整生产活动和可自由支配费用以影响成本。其他检验表明，在经济、法律和社会因素薄弱的国家，控制权和现金流权之间的分歧与成本粘性之间的负相关更为明显。本文通过研究所有权结构对成本行为的影响及其潜在机制，拓宽了对粘性成本行为的理解，并为不断增长的关于财务会计和管理会计趋同的文献做出了贡献。