This paper examines how local institutions in U.S. municipalities can affect budget allocations for socially disadvantaged groups, specifically focusing on eight key institutions related to electoral rules, power dynamics, and bureaucratic authority. Additionally, we develop a composite index to assess the overall level of (de)politicization within the local institutional framework. Theoretically, local institutions can shape public officials’ political accountability and administrative discretion during policy processes, thereby influencing their decision‐making on budget allocations. Empirical analyses primarily use data from ICMA's multiround national surveys and employ the historical background of municipalities as an instrumental variable (IV) to address potential endogeneity problems associated with local institutions. We find that local institutions that strengthen politicians’ political accountability to citizens lead to greater budget allocations for redistributive social welfare, thereby fostering social equity in public budgeting. Conversely, the institutions that enhance the authority of senior bureaucrats negatively affect budget allocations for redistributive social welfare.

中文翻译：

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公共预算中的政治问责和社会公平：考察地方机构的作用


本文研究了美国城市的地方机构如何影响对社会弱势群体的预算分配，特别关注与选举规则、权力动态和官僚权威相关的八个关键机构。此外，我们还开发了一个综合指数来评估当地机构框架内（去）政治化的整体水平。从理论上讲，地方机构可以在政策制定过程中影响公职人员的政治问责制和行政自由裁量权，从而影响他们对预算分配的决策。实证分析主要使用 ICMA 多轮全国调查的数据，并使用城市的历史背景作为工具变量 （IV） 来解决与地方机构相关的潜在内生性问题。我们发现，加强政治家对公民的政治问责的地方机构会导致更多的预算拨款用于再分配社会福利，从而促进公共预算的社会公平。相反，增强高级官僚权威的机构会对再分配社会福利的预算分配产生负面影响。