Why do rebel splinter groups emerge during peace processes, and who chooses to defect? Since Colombia's landmark peace agreement with the FARC in 2016, roughly half of the territory once controlled by the group has seen a resurgence of rebel activity by FARC splinter groups. I argue that the FARC's return to arms is a case of “middle-out fragmentation,” whereby opportunities for profit induce mid- or low-ranking rebel commanders to establish splinter groups. In Colombia, I argue that profits from the cocaine trade incentivized local-level FARC officers to defect from the peace agreement and allowed them to rapidly mobilize viable splinter groups. I offer several lines of evidence for this argument. I first construct a chronology of splinter group formation, which demonstrates that mid- and low-level commanders, rather than high-level commanders, were the key drivers of fragmentation. Second, I show that splinter groups emerged in areas where opportunities for profit were greatest. Among areas previously controlled by the FARC, those with coca cultivation prior to the peace agreement were up to thirty-seven percentage points more likely to see splinter groups emerge by 2020 than areas without significant production. Using soil and weather conditions to instrument for coca cultivation produces similar results. Further, I use a novel measure of how critical each municipality is to drug trafficking to show that areas that are theoretically most important for drug trafficking are also more likely to see FARC resurgence. I also address competing explanations related to state capacity, terrain, and popular support for the rebels. These findings highlight an important challenge to peacebuilding: satisfying the political demands of rebel leadership is a necessary but insufficient component of peace agreements in cases where opportunities for profit motivate fragmentation from the middle out.

中文翻译：

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和平与利润：哥伦比亚的叛军分裂和冲突卷土重来


为什么在和平进程中会出现叛乱的分裂团体，谁选择叛逃？自 2016 年哥伦比亚与哥伦比亚革命武装力量达成具有里程碑意义的和平协议以来，曾经由该组织控制的大约一半领土已经见证了哥伦比亚革命武装力量分裂团体的叛乱活动卷土重来。我认为，哥伦比亚革命武装力量的回归是一个“由内而外的分裂”的例子，即盈利机会诱使中低级叛军指挥官建立分裂的团体。在哥伦比亚，我认为可卡因贸易的利润激励了地方一级的哥伦比亚革命武装力量官员背叛和平协议，并使他们能够迅速动员可行的分裂团体。我为这个论点提供了几条证据。我首先构建了一个分裂集团形成的年表，这表明中低级指挥官，而不是高级指挥官，是分裂的关键驱动因素。其次，我表明，分裂的团体出现在获利机会最大的地区。在哥伦比亚革命武装力量以前控制的地区中，到2020年，那些在和平协议之前种植古柯的地区出现分裂群体的可能性比没有大量产量的地区高出37个百分点。利用土壤和天气条件来测量古柯种植会产生类似的结果。此外，我使用了一种新的衡量方法，即每个城市对毒品贩运的重要性，以表明理论上对毒品贩运最重要的地区也更有可能看到 FARC 卷土重来。我还讨论了与国家能力、地形和对叛军的普遍支持有关的相互竞争的解释。 这些发现凸显了建设和平面临的一个重要挑战：在盈利机会促使中外分裂的情况下，满足叛军领导层的政治要求是和平协议的一个必要但不充分的组成部分。