A new argument is offered which proceeds through epistemic possibility (for all S knows, p), cutting a trail from modality to Millianism, the controversial thesis that the semantic content of a proper name is simply its bearer. New definitions are provided for various epistemic modal notions. A surprising theorem about epistemic necessity is proved. A proposition p can be epistemically necessary for a knowing subject S even though p is a posteriori and S does not know p. The identity relation is well‐behaved in metaphysically possible worlds but can go rogue in epistemically possible worlds. Whereas it can be epistemically possible that Lewis Carroll is not Charles Lutwidge Dodgson, this is not epistemically possible in the manner that anti‐Millianism requires.

中文翻译：

---

从模式到米利安主义


提出了一个新的论点，它通过认识论的可能性（就所有 S 所知，p）进行，切断了从模态到米利安主义的线索，米利安主义是一个有争议的论点，即专有名词的语义内容只是它的承载者。为各种认识模态概念提供了新的定义。一个关于认识必然性的令人惊讶的定理被证明。命题 p 对于一个认识主体 S 来说可能是认识论上的必要性，即使 p 是后验的，而 S 不知道 p。身份关系在形而上学可能的世界中表现良好，但在认识论上可能的世界中可能会变得流氓。虽然刘易斯·卡罗尔在认识论上可能不是查尔斯·路特维奇·道奇森（Charles Lutwidge Dodgson），但这在认识论上不可能像反米利安主义所要求的那样。