Appointing bureaucrats based on merit and protecting them from excessive political interference have become bedrocks of modern bureaucracy. Populist leaders throughout the world, however, are looking to undermine merit systems and politicize bureaucracies. This study analyzes the impact of merit‐based appointments and bureaucratic autonomy on service delivery effectiveness, using longitudinal data from a panel of African countries. Throughout Africa, social, economic, and political conditions have made it difficult for meritocratic and autonomous bureaucracies to take root and flourish as they have elsewhere. Despite these challenges, the study's main finding is that the practice of appointing bureaucrats based on merit has a positive effect on the provision of public services like transportation infrastructure, standardized education, drinking water, sanitation, and waste disposal. Political leaders undercutting meritocratic civil services and expanding patronage appointments do so at their own peril due to the adverse consequences of their actions on governmental performance. Little evidence is found of a relationship between bureaucratic autonomy and service delivery effectiveness.

中文翻译：

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测试择优任命和官僚自主权对政府绩效的影响：来自非洲官僚机构的证据


根据能力任命官僚并保护他们免受过度的政治干预已成为现代官僚机构的基石。然而，世界各地的民粹主义领导人都在寻求破坏绩效制度并将官僚机构政治化。本研究使用来自非洲国家小组的纵向数据，分析了基于绩效的任命和官僚自主权对服务提供效率的影响。在整个非洲，社会、经济和政治条件使精英和自治的官僚机构难以像其他地方那样生根发芽。尽管存在这些挑战，但该研究的主要发现是，根据能力任命官僚的做法对提供公共服务（如交通基础设施、标准化教育、饮用水、卫生和废物处理）产生了积极影响。政治领导人削弱精英公务员制度和扩大赞助任命，由于他们的行为对政府绩效的不利影响，他们这样做是自担风险的。几乎没有证据表明官僚自主权与服务提供效率之间存在关系。