It is widely held that deontological moral theories are agent-relative because they include prohibitions on actions such as killing, or breaking promises, which cannot be understood as giving the same goal to different agents. They are thus thought to be inconsistent with consequentialism, in its traditional, agent-neutral form. However, the standard argument for this claim is incomplete, a problem which has led some to make the surprising claim that consequentialism and deontology can be reconciled. I defend the orthodox view, by developing a novel way of establishing agent-relativity, which involves showing that a moral theory admits of interpersonal dilemmas: possible situations where, whatever everyone does, someone must have acted wrongly.

中文翻译：

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后果论和道义论禁止


人们普遍认为，道义论道德理论是主体相对的，因为它们包括禁止杀戮或违背承诺等行为，这不能被理解为给不同的主体赋予相同的目标。因此，它们被认为与传统的、主体中立形式的后果主义不一致。然而，这一主张的标准论证并不完整，这个问题导致一些人提出了令人惊讶的主张，即结果论和道义论是可以调和的。我通过开发一种建立代理相对性的新方法来捍卫正统的观点，其中包括证明道德理论承认人际困境：可能的情况，无论每个人都做什么，一定有人做了错误的行为。