States often receive threats of economic coercion only after committing some transgression. While attention has been given to strategic selection in the imposition of sanctions – the notion that sanctions are imposed only after the threat of sanctions has failed to elicit compliance – selection also occurs at the threat stage. Does the possibility of economic coercion incentivize states to stay in line before they are directly threatened? This article makes two contributions. First, it presents a theory showing how the interaction between different types of threats can alter the strategic context of economic coercion in ways that potentially reverse the results of empirical analysis. It explains that states are likely to issue general threats, or threats targeting the behavior of a group of countries, when sanctions effectiveness is unknown or the identity of noncompliers is difficult to predict. Second, using quasi-experimental techniques, this article demonstrates that states actively manage the risk of losing access to a trade preference program by altering their policies. The article indicates the political consequences of economic linkages may be more extensive than previously believed.

国家往往只有在犯下一些违法行为后才会收到经济胁迫的威胁。虽然在实施制裁时已经关注了战略选择——即只有在制裁威胁未能促使遵守后才实施制裁——但选择也发生在威胁阶段。经济胁迫的可能性是否会激励各国在受到直接威胁之前保持一致？本文有两点贡献。首先，它提出了一个理论，展示了不同类型威胁之间的相互作用如何以可能逆转实证分析结果的方式改变经济胁迫的战略环境。它解释了当制裁效果未知或不遵守者的身份难以预测时，各国可能会发出一般威胁或针对一组国家行为的威胁。其次，本文使用准实验技术表明，各州通过改变其政策来积极管理失去贸易优惠计划的风险。文章指出，经济联系的政治后果可能比以前认为的更广泛。