According to internalism about prudential value, the token states of affairs that are basically good for you must be suitably connected, under the proper conditions, to your positive attitudes. It is commonly thought that any theory of welfare that implies internalism is guaranteed to respect the alienation constraint, the doctrine that you cannot be alienated from that which is basically good for you. In this paper, I show that extant formulations of internalism do not have this desirable feature. The central defect of traditional formulations is that they do not respect an important but overlooked truth about alienation: namely, that even if a state of affairs is suitably connected to your positive attitudes, your negative attitudes can nonetheless render you alienated from it. By taking into account the relevance of the negative attitudes, I propose the new internalism—the view that x is basically good for you only if you have a net positive attitude towards it—as a way to advance our thinking about what is required to avoid alienating theories of welfare.

根据关于审慎价值的内在主义，在适当的条件下，基本上对你有利的象征性事态必须与你的积极态度适当地联系起来。人们普遍认为，任何暗示内在主义的福利理论都保证尊重异化约束，即你不能与基本上对你有益的东西疏远的教义。在本文中，我表明现存的内在主义表述不具备这种理想的特征。传统表述的核心缺陷是它们不尊重一个关于异化的重要但被忽视的事实：即，即使一种状况与你的积极态度适当地联系在一起，你的消极态度仍然会使你与它疏远。通过考虑消极态度的相关性，我提出了新的内在主义——认为只有当你对 x 持净积极的态度时，它基本上对你有好处——作为推进我们思考需要什么来避免疏远福利理论的一种方式。