Castañeda, Perry and Lewis argued that, among singular thoughts in general, thoughts about oneself ‘as oneself’—first-personal thoughts, which Lewis aptly called de se—have a distinctive character that traditional views of contents cannot characterize. Drawing on Anscombe, Annalisa Coliva has argued that a feature she calls Real Guarantee marks apart de se thoughts—as opposed to others including Immunity to Error through Misidentification that have been proposed for that role. I'll argue that, while her work points to a truly distinguishing feature of the de se, we need an account of the notion other than hers and Echeverri's recent development of it. I'll offer an alternative, drawing on Léa Salje's work. Finally, I'll briefly outline how, thus understood, the Real Guarantee feature could be adequately explained by theories of de se thoughts like the one I favour, even if it is an open option to just explain it away.

中文翻译：

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De Se 思想中的真正保证：如何描述它？


卡斯塔涅达、佩里和刘易斯认为，在一般的单一思想中，关于“作为自己”的思想——第一人称思想，刘易斯恰当地称之为 de se——具有传统内容观无法描述的独特特征。Annalisa Coliva 借鉴 Anscombe 的观点，认为她称之为 Real Guarantee 的功能标志着 de se 思想的分离，这与为该角色提出的包括 Immunity to Error through Misidentification 在内的其他功能相反。我会争辩说，虽然她的工作指出了 de se 的一个真正显着特征，但我们需要一个解释，而不是她和 Echeverri 最近对它的发展。我将提供另一种选择，借鉴 Léa Salje 的作品。最后，我将简要概述如何通过我所赞成的 de se 思想理论来充分解释 Real Guarantee 功能，即使这是一个公开的选择，可以简单地解释它。