We quantify the cost of pledging collateral for small businesses by exploiting a regulatory quirk of the SBA disaster lending program in which firms are exempt from posting collateral if their loan size is below a threshold. Firms bunch their loans below the threshold, and the resulting distortion in the loan size distribution reveals the magnitude of the collateral cost. The collateral cost is substantial and varies across collateral types, business sectors, and collateral laws in ways consistent with flexibility-based theories. Our findings have implications for firms’ borrowing constraints and disaster lending program designs. (JEL E44, E51, G21, G23, G33)

中文翻译：

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抵押品的影子成本


我们通过利用 SBA 灾难贷款计划的监管怪癖来量化小企业质押抵押品的成本，在该计划中，如果公司的贷款规模低于阈值，则公司可以免于提供抵押品。公司将贷款集中在低于阈值以下，由此产生的贷款规模分布的扭曲揭示了抵押成本的规模。抵押成本很高，并且以与基于灵活性的理论一致的方式因抵押品类型、业务部门和抵押法律而异。我们的研究结果对公司的借款限制和灾难贷款计划设计具有启示意义。（JEL E44、E51、G21、G23、G33）