This paper generalizes the preface paradox beyond the conjunctive aggregation of beliefs and constructs an analogous paradox for deontic reasoning. The analysis of the deontic case suggests a systematic restriction of intuitive rules for reasoning with obligations. This proposal can be transferred to the epistemic case: It avoids the preface and the lottery paradox and saves one of the two directions of the Lockean Thesis (i.e. high credence is sufficient, but not necessary for rational belief). The resulting account compares favorably to competing proposals; in particular, we can formulate the rules of correct doxastic reasoning without reference to probabilistic features of the involved propositions.

中文翻译：

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认识论和道义论序言悖论


本文将前言悖论概括为信仰的联合聚合之外，并为道义推理构建了一个类似的悖论。对 deontic 案例的分析表明，对推理义务的直觉规则进行了系统性限制。这个提议可以转移到认识论的情况下：它避免了序言和彩票悖论，并保存了洛克论的两个方向之一（即高可信度就足够了，但不是理性信仰所必需的）。与竞争提案相比，生成的帐户具有优势;特别是，我们可以在不参考所涉及命题的概率特征的情况下制定正确的 doxastic 推理规则。