An influential version of the Consequence argument, the most famous argument for the incompatibility of free will and determinism, goes as follows: For an agent to be able to do otherwise, there has to be a possible world with the same laws and the same past as her actual world in which she does otherwise. However, if the actual world is deterministic, there is no such world. Hence, no agent in a deterministic world can ever do otherwise. In this paper, I discuss a recent version of this argument due to Christopher Franklin: the ‘No Opportunity argument’. I argue that the No Opportunity argument overgeneralizes. If its premises were true, things would be obstacles to doing otherwise that have nothing to do with determinism and that intuitively are not obstacles.

中文翻译：

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在确定性世界中执行其他操作


后果论证的一个有影响力的版本，也是自由意志和决定论不相容的最著名论证，如下：要使一个主体能够做其他事情，就必须有一个可能的世界，与她所处的现实世界具有相同的规律和相同的过去。但是，如果现实世界是确定性的，那么就没有这样的世界。因此，在确定性世界中，任何代理都无法执行其他操作。在本文中，我讨论了克里斯托弗·富兰克林 （Christopher Franklin） 的这一论点的最新版本：“没有机会的论点”。我认为“没有机会”的论点过于笼统。如果它的前提是正确的，那么事情就会成为与决定论无关的障碍，而且在直觉上也不是障碍。