The morality of artificial intelligence (AI) has become a contentious topic in academic and public debates. We argue that AIs moral acceptance depends not only on its ability to accomplish a task in line with moral norms but also on the social status attributed to AI. Agent type (AI vs. computer program vs. human), gender, and organizational membership impact moral permissibility. In a factorial survey experiment, 578 participants rated the moral acceptability of agents performing a task (e.g., cancer diagnostics). We find that using AI is judged less morally acceptable than employing human agents. AI used in high-status organizations is judged more morally acceptable than in low-status organizations. No differences were found between computer programs and AI. Neither anthropomorphic nor gender framing had an effect. Thus, human agents in high-status organizations receive a moral surplus purely based on their structural position in a cultural status hierarchy regardless of their actual performance.

中文翻译：

---

社会地位和人工智能的道德接受度


人工智能 （AI） 的道德问题已成为学术界和公共辩论中一个有争议的话题。我们认为，人工智能的道德接受度不仅取决于其按照道德规范完成任务的能力，还取决于人工智能所赋予的社会地位。代理类型（人工智能、计算机程序、人类）、性别和组织成员身份会影响道德允许性。在一项析因调查实验中，578 名参与者对执行任务（例如癌症诊断）的代理人的道德可接受性进行了评分。我们发现，与使用人类代理相比，使用 AI 在道德上更不可接受。高地位组织中使用的 AI 被认为比低地位组织在道德上更容易接受。计算机程序和 AI 之间没有发现差异。拟人化和性别框架都没有影响。因此，高地位组织中的人类代理纯粹基于他们在文化地位等级制度中的结构地位而获得道德盈余，而不管他们的实际表现如何。