According to some dialetheists, we ought to reject the distinction between object and meta‐languages. Given that dialetheists advocate truth‐value gluts within their object‐language, whether in order to solve the liar paradox or for some other reason, this rejection of the object‐/meta‐language distinction comes with the commitment to use a glutty metatheory. While it has been pointed out that a glutty metatheory brings with it expressive deficiencies, we highlight here another complication arising from the use of a glutty metatheory, this time evidential in nature. According to this countermodel problem, while the thoroughgoing dialetheist who embraces a glutty metatheory can justify their acceptance of a rule of inference's invalidity using countermodels, to justify their renunciation of an unwanted rule they actually require the means to warrant their rejection of the rule's validity—which cannot be supplied by countermodels based on a standard dialetheic semantics. We end by sketching out a possible solution for the thoroughgoing dialetheist using a bilaterialist semantics.

中文翻译：

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二元论和反模型问题


根据一些辩证论者的说法，我们应该拒绝对象语言和元语言之间的区别。鉴于辩证论者在他们的客语中提倡真理-价值过剩，无论是为了解决说谎者悖论还是出于其他原因，这种对客语-/元-语言区别的拒绝伴随着对使用贪吃的元理论的承诺。虽然已经指出贪吃的元理论带来了表达上的缺陷，但我们在这里强调使用贪吃元理论引起的另一个复杂性，这一次是证据性质的。根据这个反模型问题，虽然接受贪吃元理论的彻底辩证论者可以使用反模型来证明他们接受推理规则的无效性，但为了证明他们放弃不想要的规则是合理的，他们实际上需要手段来证明他们拒绝规则的有效性——而这不能由基于标准辩证语义学的反模型提供。最后，我们使用双边主义语义学为彻底的辩证论者勾勒出一个可能的解决方案。