Existing studies tend to focus on how a legal system reinforces the efficiency of its domestic firms or foreign companies that are subject to its domestic jurisdiction (e.g., via cross-listing). Our study provides critical normative implications in the era of financial globalization by showing that the influence of a country’s legal institutions extend beyond its territorial boundaries. We examine whether US shareholder-initiated class action lawsuits can discipline non-US firms. Using an international sample of firms over the period 1994–2019, we find that a US class action lawsuit against a non-US firm cross-listed in the US negatively affects the value of its non-US-listed industry peers. The effect is robust in both event-based analyses for short-term market reaction and stacked difference-in-difference analyses for long-term valuation. We uncover two economic mechanisms underlying this effect: information sharing and policy coordination between the US and the non-US firm’s home country. Specifically, the cross-border disciplining effect is more pronounced for firms from countries that lack information and that coordinate with the US at the policy level. Moreover, non-US peer firms subsequently improve their governance practices and financial policies to restore shareholder value. Our findings suggest that private enforcement in the US has a worldwide influence.

现有的研究往往集中在法律制度如何加强其国内公司或受其国内管辖的外国公司的效率（例如，通过交叉上市）。我们的研究通过表明一个国家的法律制度的影响力超越了其领土边界，为金融全球化时代提供了关键的规范性意义。我们研究了美国股东发起的集体诉讼是否可以对非美国公司进行纪律处分。使用 1994 年至 2019 年期间的国际公司样本，我们发现针对在美国交叉上市的非美国公司的美国集体诉讼对其非美国上市行业同行的价值产生了负面影响。在短期市场反应的基于事件的分析和长期估值的堆叠双重差分分析中，这种效果都是稳健的。我们揭示了这种效应背后的两个经济机制：美国和非美国公司母国之间的信息共享和政策协调。具体来说，对于来自缺乏信息并在政策层面与美国协调的国家的公司，跨境纪律效应更为明显。此外，非美国同行公司随后改善其治理实践和财务政策，以恢复股东价值。我们的研究结果表明，美国的私人执法具有全球影响力。