One of the major challenges in the philosophy of religion is theological fatalism — roughly, the claim that divine omniscience is incompatible with free will. In this article, I present new reasons to be sceptical of what I consider to be the strongest argument for theological fatalism. First, I argue that divine foreknowledge is not necessary for an argument against free will if we take into account divine knowledge of contingent a priori truths. Second, I show that this argument can be generalized so that ordinary human knowledge of contingent a priori truths also leads to an argument against free will. This, I believe, results in an absurd conclusion that is unacceptable to both theists and non-theists. But if there is something wrong with this argument, there is something wrong, too, with the argument for theological fatalism. Although there is a range of possible responses, I suggest that the core issue in all cases is a closure principle — specifically, the principle that ‘no choice about’ is closed under entailment (or strict implication).

中文翻译：

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自由、全知和先验的偶然性


宗教哲学的主要挑战之一是神学宿命论——粗略地说，声称神圣的全知与自由意志是不相容的。在这篇文章中，我提出了新的理由，对我认为是神学宿命论最有力的论据持怀疑态度。首先，我认为，如果我们考虑到神圣对或有先验真理的知识，那么神圣的预知就不是反对自由意志的论点所必需的。其次，我表明这个论点可以被推广，因此普通人类对或有先验真理的知识也导致了反对自由意志的论点。我相信，这导致了一个荒谬的结论，有神论者和非有神论者都无法接受。但是，如果这个论点有问题，那么神学宿命论的论点也有问题。尽管有一系列可能的回应，但我建议在所有情况下的核心问题是闭合原则——具体来说，“别无选择”的原则在蕴涵（或严格暗示）下是闭合的。