This article takes issue with two prominent views in the current debate around epistemic partiality in friendship. Strong views of epistemic partiality hold that friendship may require biased beliefs in direct conflict with epistemic norms. Weak views hold that friendship may place normative expectations on belief formation but in a manner that does not violate these norms. It is argued that neither view succeeds in explaining the relationship between epistemic norms and friendship norms. Weak views inadvertently endorse a form of motivated reasoning, failing to resolve the normative clash they seek to avoid. Strong views turn out to be incoherent once we consider the question of whether the requirement to form an epistemically partial belief is independent of whether the belief in question would be true. It is then argued that an epistemology of friendship should recognise the special role that understanding plays in friendship. On this view, friendship normatively requires understanding the truth about our friends. This entails that epistemic partiality, far from being a requirement, is in fact at odds with good friendship.

中文翻译：

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 了解友谊


本文对当前围绕友谊中认识偏袒的辩论中的两个突出观点提出了异议。对认识论偏袒的强烈观点认为，友谊可能需要与认识论规范直接冲突的偏见信念。弱观点认为，友谊可能会对信仰形成提出规范性的期望，但不会违反这些规范。有人认为，这两种观点都无法成功地解释认识规范和友谊规范之间的关系。弱观点无意中认可了一种动机推理形式，未能解决他们试图避免的规范冲突。一旦我们考虑形成认识论上部分信念的要求是否独立于所讨论的信念是否为真的问题，那么强烈的观点就会变得不连贯。然后，有人认为友谊的认识论应该认识到理解在友谊中所起的特殊作用。根据这种观点，友谊规范地要求了解我们朋友的真相。这意味着认识论的偏袒远非一项要求，实际上与良好的友谊相悖。