This paper is concerned with state capacity and autocrat survival. We argue that state strength in autocracies increases leader tenure but reduces the stability of the regime itself; stronger autocracies run a higher risk of transitioning to democracy. This trade-off arises as a result of how state capacity affects the behavior of elite challengers. A stronger state reduces the likelihood of the ruler being ousted by force, inducing rival elites to switch tactics to peaceful support for democracy. An autocrat may prolong his tenure by investing in state capacity, but this brings on the downfall of the autocratic regime itself. We analyze the implications of our argument using a variety of historical sources providing information on 47 autocracies from 1800 to 2012. Our empirical findings, in part based on original data collection, are in line with the theoretical expectations: in strong states autocrats survive, but autocracies die.

中文翻译：

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双刃剑：国家能力如何延长专制任期但加速民主化


本文关注国家能力和独裁者的生存。我们认为，专制国家中的国家实力增加了领导人的任期，但降低了政权本身的稳定性;更强大的专制国家向民主过渡的风险更高。这种权衡是由于国家能力如何影响精英挑战者的行为而产生的。一个更强大的国家会降低统治者被武力推翻的可能性，从而诱使敌对精英改变策略，以和平方式支持民主。独裁者可以通过投资于国家能力来延长他的任期，但这会带来专制政权本身的垮台。我们使用各种历史资料分析我们论点的含义，这些资料提供了 1800 年至 2012 年 47 个专制国家的信息。我们的实证发现，部分基于原始数据收集，与理论预期一致：在强国，独裁者生存，但独裁者死亡。