There are two broad views in the epistemology of testimony, conservatism and liberalism. The two views disagree over a particular necessary condition on testimonial justification: the positive reasons requirement (PRR). Perhaps the most prominent objection levelled at liberalism from the conservative camp stems from gullibility; without PRR, the thought goes, an objectionable form of gullibility looms large for liberals. In this paper I aim to make two main contributions: to introduce a new metric for adjudicating this debate; and to argue that, from the perspective of this new metric, the liberal view is stronger than has been appreciated. Drawing on work from James (The Will to believe and other essays in Popular Philosophy, Harvard University Press, 1896), Goldman (Epistemology and Cognition, Harvard University Press, 1986), and Kelp et al. (Synthese 197:5187–5202, 2020), I firstly countenance the distinction between positive and negative epistemic measures. Positive measures concern, roughly, the acquisition of truths, whereas negative measures concern the avoidance of falsehoods. Both, it is argued, are relevant to epistemic justification, but this debate has proceeded in such a way as to overemphasise the importance of the latter over the former. Once this distinction is made, new conceptual terrain opens for the liberal. Rather than being resigned to a predominantly defensive role—of mitigating worries about negative measures—the liberal can go on the offensive, and explore the independent epistemic strengths of their position. The upshot is that liberals have a new way to dispel their most prominent objection.

在证词的认识论中，有两种广泛的观点，保守主义和自由主义。这两种观点在证词理由的一个特定必要条件上存在分歧：积极理由要求 （PRR）。也许保守派阵营对自由主义最突出的反对源于轻信;他们认为，如果没有 PRR，自由派就会面临一种令人反感的轻信形式。在本文中，我旨在做出两个主要贡献：引入一个新的标准来裁决这场辩论;并论证说，从这个新指标的角度来看，自由派的观点比人们所欣赏的要强大。借鉴詹姆斯（《信仰的意志》和《大众哲学》中的其他文章，哈佛大学出版社，1896 年）、戈德曼（《认识论与认知》，哈佛大学出版社，1986 年）和凯尔普等人（综合 197：5187-5202,2020 年）的工作，我首先支持积极和消极认识测量之间的区别。积极的衡量标准大致涉及真理的获得，而消极的衡量标准则涉及避免谎言。有人认为，两者都与认识论的正当性有关，但这场辩论的进行方式过分强调了后者的重要性。一旦做出了这种区分，新的概念领域就会为自由派打开。自由主义者可以继续进攻，探索他们立场的独立认识优势，而不是甘于承担主要的防御性角色——减轻对负面措施的担忧。结果是，自由派有一种新的方法来消除他们最突出的反对意见。