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Time-Consistent Individuals, Time-Inconsistent Households
Journal of Finance ( IF 7.6 ) Pub Date : 2024-10-16 , DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13392 ANDREW HERTZBERG
Journal of Finance ( IF 7.6 ) Pub Date : 2024-10-16 , DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13392 ANDREW HERTZBERG
I present a model of consumption and savings for a multiperson household in which members are imperfectly altruistic, derive utility from both private and shared public goods, and share wealth. I show that, despite having standard exponential time preferences, the household is time-inconsistent: Members save too little and overspend on private consumption goods. The household remains time-inconsistent even when members save separately, because the possibility of voluntary transfers or joint contribution to the public good preserves the dynamic commons problem. The household will choose to share wealth when the risk-sharing benefits outweigh the utility cost of overconsumption.
中文翻译:
时间一致的个体,时间不一致的家庭
我提出了一个多人家庭的消费和储蓄模型,其中的成员不完全利他主义,从私人和共享公共产品中获得效用,并分享财富。我表明,尽管有标准的指数时间偏好,但家庭的时间不一致:成员储蓄太少,在私人消费品上超支。即使成员单独储蓄,家庭的时间也保持不一致,因为自愿转移或共同为公共利益做出贡献的可能性保留了动态的公地问题。当风险分担的好处超过过度消费的效用成本时,家庭将选择分享财富。
更新日期:2024-10-16
中文翻译:
时间一致的个体,时间不一致的家庭
我提出了一个多人家庭的消费和储蓄模型,其中的成员不完全利他主义,从私人和共享公共产品中获得效用,并分享财富。我表明,尽管有标准的指数时间偏好,但家庭的时间不一致:成员储蓄太少,在私人消费品上超支。即使成员单独储蓄,家庭的时间也保持不一致,因为自愿转移或共同为公共利益做出贡献的可能性保留了动态的公地问题。当风险分担的好处超过过度消费的效用成本时,家庭将选择分享财富。