This paper studies whether firms opportunistically make proprietary claims in mandatory environmental disclosure programs with trade secret exemption rules. Examining the mandatory chemical disclosure program in the fracking industry, I find evidence of opportunistic withholding of information among operators that are less likely to have trade secrets. Specifically, I find that these operators claim fewer chemicals as trade secrets when the operating site is in close proximity to water quality monitors. This is only observed among publicly traded operators that face a higher cost of societal backlash when disclosing pollutant information. Further analyses suggest that these operators are concerned about external environmental monitoring, which deters them from opportunistic information withholding. Regarding public and private operators that are more likely to have trade secrets, I do not find strong evidence that their information withholding varies with the monitoring conditions.

中文翻译：

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要么遵守，要么解释：公司是否在强制性环境信息披露计划中投机取巧地索取商业秘密？


本文研究了公司是否在具有商业秘密豁免规则的强制性环境披露计划中投机取巧地提出专有声明。通过研究水力压裂行业的强制性化学品披露计划，我发现有证据表明，不太可能拥有商业秘密的运营商会投机取巧地隐瞒信息。具体来说，我发现当操作场所靠近水质监测器时，这些运营商声称作为商业秘密的化学品较少。这仅在公开交易的运营商中观察到，这些运营商在披露污染信息时面临更高的社会反弹成本。进一步的分析表明，这些运营商担心外部环境监测，这阻止了他们机会主义的信息隐瞒。对于更有可能拥有商业秘密的公共和私人运营商，我没有找到强有力的证据表明他们的信息隐瞒会随着监控条件而变化。