The militarization of border control is a defining feature of contemporary international politics. Why do states flock toward these policies despite their questionable efficacy? We theorize that border militarization stems in part from public reactions to the threat of international and domestic decline. We test this argument with two conjoint experiments that randomize the implementing agency, strategy, costs, and effectiveness of different policies. First, we evaluate whether the public has a baseline preference for militarization, holding constant the material costs and consequences of the border policy. Second, we prime threats of decline—in terms of either America’s dominant status in the world or the majority position of white-identifying Americans within the U.S.—and track changes in preferences for militarized border policies. The results indicate that both threats of decline can increase support for border militarization, with important partisan differences. Border militarization plausibly stems from the reactionary politics of domestic audiences.

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解释公众对边境军事化的要求


边境控制的军事化是当代国际政治的一个决定性特征。为什么各国不顾这些政策的有效性值得怀疑，却蜂拥而至？我们推测，边境军事化部分源于公众对国际和国内衰落威胁的反应。我们通过两个联合实验来检验这一论点，这两个实验随机化了不同政策的实施机构、策略、成本和有效性。首先，我们评估公众是否对军事化有基本偏好，同时保持边境政策的物质成本和后果不变。其次，我们主要考虑衰落的威胁——根据美国在世界上的主导地位或美国境内白人身份的美国人的多数地位——并跟踪对军事化边境政策的偏好变化。结果表明，这两种衰落威胁都可以增加对边境军事化的支持，但存在重要的党派差异。边境军事化似乎源于国内观众的反动政治。