In this study, we experimentally test the theoretical results of a contest game between groups when the value of the prize is fixed and when it is endogenously determined. It can decrease with contest efforts of all groups as in the case of an armed conflict or a lawsuit. The value of the prize can also increase with contest efforts as in the case of a patent race. We also analyze the impact of different groupings of players on contest efforts. We observe overinvestment and no negative effect of group size whether the prize value is exogenous or endogenous. Also, a productive contest seems to have no positive effect on individual investments. A destructive contest, however, does have a significant negative impact, but this effect is reduced with a larger number of competing groups.

中文翻译：

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富有成效和破坏性的小组竞赛：一项实验调查


在这项研究中，我们实验测试了当奖品的价值是固定的并且它是内生确定的时，组间竞赛游戏的理论结果。它会随着所有团体的竞争努力而减少，例如在武装冲突或诉讼的情况下。奖品的价值也会随着比赛的努力而增加，就像在专利竞赛中一样。我们还分析了不同玩家分组对比赛努力的影响。我们观察到过度投资，无论奖金值是外生的还是内生的，群体规模都没有负面影响。此外，一场富有成效的比赛似乎对个人投资没有积极影响。然而，破坏性的比赛确实会产生重大的负面影响，但这种影响会随着竞争小组数量的增加而降低。