A motivating reason is a reason an agent acts for. There are two pre-theoretical intuitions about motivating reasons that seem irreconcilable. One intuition suggests that motivating reasons are factive, and the other says the opposite. As a result, a divide exists between philosophers, each side prioritizing one intuition to the detriment of the other. In this essay, I present the deliberate theory of motivating reasons and defend the second intuition that motivating reasons are non-factive. To do this, we must understand motivating reasons’ role in our deliberation. I show that non-factive motivating reasons are compatible with the underlying role which gives rise to the intuition of reasons’ factivity.

激励性理由是代理人采取行动的原因。关于激励原因，有两种前理论直觉似乎不可调和。一种直觉表明激励性原因是事实，而另一种直觉则相反。因此，哲学家之间存在分歧，每一方都优先考虑一种直觉，而损害了另一种直觉。在这篇文章中，我提出了激励理由的刻意理论，并为第二种直觉辩护，即激励理由是非事实的。要做到这一点，我们必须了解激励理由在我们的审议中的作用。我表明，非事实激励性理由与产生原因积极性直觉的潜在作用是相容的。