Hempel never met Ramsey, but he knew his work. In his 1958 The Theoretician’s Dilemma: a study in the logic of theory construction, Hempel introduces the term Ramsey sentence, referring to Ramsey’s attempt in Theories to get rid of theoretical terms in formal accounts of scientific theories. In this paper, I draw the attention to another connection between Ramsey’s and Hempel’s works. Hempel’s Deductive-Nomological (DN) account of scientific explanation resembles very closely Ramsey’s account of a certain type of conditional sentences. In the first part of the paper, by introducing a fictional story, I highlight the similarities and differences between the two. In the last part of the paper, I claim that the most relevant difference between Ramsey and Hempel can be used to offer original solutions to Hempel’s Raven Paradox. Two possibilities are presented, arguing that the second, which requires a reconsideration of the formalisation of laws, is the most promising.

Hempel 从未见过 Ramsey，但他知道他的工作。在他 1958 年的《理论家的困境：理论建构逻辑研究》中，Hempel 引入了 Ramsey 句子一词，指的是 Ramsey 在《理论》中试图在科学理论的正式描述中摆脱理论术语。在本文中，我提请注意拉姆齐和亨佩尔作品之间的另一个联系。亨佩尔对科学解释的演绎名词 （DN） 描述与拉姆齐对某种类型的条件句的描述非常相似。在论文的第一部分，通过介绍一个虚构的故事，我强调了两者之间的相似之处和不同之处。在论文的最后一部分，我声称 Ramsey 和 Hempel 之间最相关的差异可以用来为 Hempel 的 Raven 悖论提供原始解决方案。提出了两种可能性，认为第二种可能性需要重新考虑法律的正式化，是最有希望的。