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Intentions and Inquiry
Mind ( IF 1.8 ) Pub Date : 2024-10-01 , DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzae056
Daniel C Friedman

This paper defends the Intention Account of Individual Inquiry. On this account, inquiry is best understood by appeal to a ‘question-directed intention’ (QDI), an intention to answer a question broadly construed. This account’s core commitments help meet recent challenges plaguing extant approaches to characterizing inquiry. First, QDIs are the type of mental state central to inquiry, not attitudes like curiosity or wonder. Second, holding a QDI towards a question and acting in service of it constitutes the start of inquiry. Third, controversial norms which mandate a rational inquirer’s ignorance towards the answer to her question can be reformulated and defended by appeal to rational constraints on intention. Fourth, instrumental pressures inquirers face are the standard pressures of plan-rationality. In defending these theses, I show that the Intention Account provides compelling explanations to standing challenges, in ways competitors cannot. It does so by advancing understanding of how our epistemic and practical agency are intertwined.

中文翻译:

 意向及询问


本文为个人探究的意图账户辩护。因此,最好通过诉诸“问题导向意图”(QDI)来理解探究,即回答广义问题的意图。该账户的核心承诺有助于应对困扰现有调查特征方法的最新挑战。首先,QDI 是一种以探究为中心的精神状态,而不是好奇或惊奇等态度。其次,针对某个问题持有 QDI 并为其服务而采取行动构成了调查的开始。第三,那些要求理性询问者对其问题的答案一无所知的有争议的规范可以通过诉诸对意图的理性约束来重新表述和辩护。第四,询问者面临的工具性压力是计划理性的标准压力。在捍卫这些论点时,我表明意向账户为长期存在的挑战提供了令人信服的解释,这是竞争对手无法做到的。它通过增进对我们的认知和实践机构如何交织在一起的理解来实现这一点。
更新日期:2024-10-01
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