This article is concerned with a puzzle that arises from three initially plausible assumptions that form an inconsistent triad: (i) Epistemic reasons are normative reasons (normativism); (ii) reasons are normative only if conformity with them is good (the reasons/value‐link); (iii) conformity with epistemic reasons need not be good (the nihilist assumption). I start by defending the reasons/value‐link, arguing that normativists need to reject the nihilist assumption. I then argue that the most familiar view that denies the nihilist assumption—epistemic teleology—is untenable. Finally, I consider two alternative ways of accounting for the goodness of conformity with epistemic reasons: it may be good because it accords with the virtue of reasons‐responsiveness, and it may be good because it is good to conform with normative reasons as such. I argue that both of these conceptions avoid the problems of epistemic teleology and merit serious consideration as potential solutions to the puzzle.

中文翻译：

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没有认知目的论的认知规范性


本文关注的是由三个最初看似合理的假设所产生的难题，这些假设形成了一个不一致的三元组：（i）认知原因是规范原因（规范主义）； (ii) 只有在符合良好的情况下，理由才是规范性的（理由/价值链接）； (iii) 与认知原因的一致性不一定是好的（虚无主义假设）。我首先捍卫原因/价值联系，认为规范主义者需要拒绝虚无主义假设。然后我认为否认虚无主义假设的最常见的观点——认知目的论——是站不住脚的。最后，我考虑了两种解释与认知原因相符的好处的替代方法：它可能是好的，因为它符合原因响应性的美德，它可能是好的，因为它符合规范原因本身是好的。我认为这两个概念都避免了认知目的论的问题，并且值得认真考虑作为该难题的潜在解决方案。