The growth of rules in modern democracies burdens citizens, businesses, and administrative bodies. To address this, many governments have implemented so‐called “regulatory offsetting schemes,” requiring the removal of existing rules and regulations for each new one introduced. However, systematic knowledge on which countries have adopted these schemes and their specific designs remains lacking. Our study maps regulatory offsetting initiatives across OECD states and offers a first theoretical framework for understanding government adoption. While political and ideational factors influence the adoption of offsetting schemes, they do not explain their specific design. Offsetting schemes thus reflect the political tensions between advocates for an activist state and supporters of a more restrained government, with design being of secondary importance. These findings enhance our understanding of how governments and public administrations manage rule growth.

中文翻译：

---

先进民主国家的监管抵消


现代民主国家中规则的增长给公民、企业和行政机构带来了负担。为了解决这个问题，许多政府实施了所谓的“监管抵消计划”，要求每一项新引入的规则和法规都取消现有规则和法规。然而，仍然缺乏关于哪些国家采用了这些计划及其具体设计的系统知识。我们的研究描绘了经合组织国家的监管抵消举措，并为理解政府的采用提供了第一个理论框架。虽然政治和理念因素影响抵消计划的采用，但它们并没有解释其具体设计。因此，抵消计划反映了激进国家的倡导者和更加克制的政府的支持者之间的政治紧张关系，而设计是次要的。这些发现增强了我们对政府和公共行政部门如何管理规则增长的理解。