Empirical studies have shown that terrorists’ policy goals are rarely achieved, leading some to conclude that terrorism doesn’t work. We theorize that terrorism can work, but for its supporters rather than for the terrorists themselves. Because supporters are willing to contribute resources to a terrorist organization, thereby increasing the organization’s ability to launch attacks, this can coerce the targeted government to revise its policies in accordance with the supporters’ preferences. Targeted governments may respond with concessions in order to erode support and thereby render the terrorists easier to defeat. Support can be rational even when supporters’ ideal policies are closer to those of the government than to those of the terrorists. We examine Hamas and the Provisional IRA, generally regarded as failures. We show that targeted governments sometimes made concessions that placated supporters but not the terrorists, and that this was followed by reduced support for and occurrence of violence.

中文翻译：

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恐怖主义对其支持者来说是有效的


实证研究表明，恐怖分子的政策目标很少能够实现，这导致一些人得出恐怖主义行不通的结论。我们的理论是，恐怖主义可以发挥作用，但对其支持者而不是恐怖分子本身而言。由于支持者愿意向恐怖组织贡献资源，从而提高该组织发动袭击的能力，这可以迫使目标政府按照支持者的偏好修改政策。目标政府可能会做出让步来回应，以削弱支持，从而使恐怖分子更容易被击败。即使支持者的理想政策更接近政府的政策而不是恐怖分子的政策，支持也可能是理性的。我们研究了哈马斯和临时爱尔兰共和军，它们通常被认为是失败的。我们表明，目标政府有时会做出让步来安抚支持者，但不能安抚恐怖分子，随后就会减少对暴力的支持和发生。