In recent years, there has been increasing emphasis on firms’ investment in happiness and the associated benefits of doing so. In this paper, we discuss the agency problem regarding investments in happiness. The agency problem occurs when managers’ motivations for investing in happiness differ from shareholders’ motivations, leading to a conflict of interests that affects every key corporate decision. To investigate this problem, we propose a theoretical framework that integrates financial incentives with behavioral aspects, and use it to analyze the decision-making process of managers and shareholders. We also provide a detailed account of their anticipated benefits and utilities arising from investing in happiness. We explain the financial implications of the value gap that results from the inherent conflict of interests and provide appropriate solutions for reducing the gap in a variety of circumstances.

近年来，人们越来越重视企业对幸福的投资以及这样做的相关好处。在本文中，我们讨论了幸福投资的代理问题。当管理者投资幸福的动机与股东的动机不同时，就会出现代理问题，导致利益冲突，影响每一个关键的公司决策。为了研究这个问题，我们提出了一个将财务激励与行为方面相结合的理论框架，并用它来分析管理者和股东的决策过程。我们还详细介绍了他们投资幸福所带来的预期收益和效用。我们解释了因固有利益冲突而产生的价值差距的财务影响，并提供了在各种情况下缩小差距的适当解决方案。