Traditionally, family firm studies have assumed there is a single family behind the firm. We challenge this assumption and argue that the distinction between multi-founding family firms and single-founding family firms matters. We theorize that multi-founding family firms, based on mutual monitoring among families, have corporate governance advantages (less principal–agent and principal–principal problems) in terms of reduced founder CEO entrenchment and a lower probability of descendent leadership. Furthermore, we argue that multi-founding family firms exhibit higher levels of innovation and performance. Based on U.S. firms during 2001 to 2010, we find robust support for our arguments.

中文翻译：

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多重创立的家族企业：对公司治理、创新和绩效的影响


传统上，家族企业研究假设公司背后有一个单一的家族。我们质疑这一假设，并认为多重创办的家族企业和单一创办的家族企业之间的区别很重要。我们的理论是，基于家族之间相互监督的多创始人家族企业在减少创始人首席执行官的壁垒和降低后代领导的可能性方面具有公司治理优势（较少的委托代理和委托人问题）。此外，我们认为，多重创立的家族企业表现出更高水平的创新和绩效。基于 2001 年至 2010 年期间的美国公司，我们发现我们的论点得到了强有力的支持。