Philosophers have appealed to a wide variety of different factors in providing a metaphysics of race: appearance, ancestry, systems of oppression, shared ways of life, and so-called ‘racial essences’. I distinguish four importantly different questions about racial groups that one may be answering in appealing these factors. I then show that marking these distinctions proves quite fruitful, revealing ways of strengthening existing arguments for the non-existence of racial groups, new avenues for addressing challenges to biological and constructionist accounts of race, and a range of hybrid positions that have been largely overlooked in the literature.

中文翻译：

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种族形而上学的框架


哲学家们在提供种族形而上学时诉诸了各种各样的不同因素：外表、血统、压迫制度、共同的生活方式以及所谓的“种族本质”。我区分了关于种族群体的四个重要的不同问题，人们在诉诸这些因素时可能会回答这些问题。然后，我表明，标记这些区别被证明是非常富有成效的，揭示了加强种族群体不存在的现有论点的方法，解决种族生物学和建构主义解释挑战的新途径，以及一系列在很大程度上被忽视的混合立场在文献中。