This case study examines whether politically connected entrepreneurs benefit from their political connections. We study the regulated Thai telecoms industry from its inception in the early 1980s. We examine the telecoms firms owned by an entrepreneur turned politician, who rose to the position of prime minister in 2001 and was deposed in 2006. We develop the concepts of the political entrepreneur and his/her political lifecycle. We show that the value of political entrepreneur's political activities and connections varies through this lifecycle. Political entrepreneurs are likely to benefit more from informal ties with politicians and less visible political involvement early in their lifecycle, while rising to higher-level political offices is less likely to benefit them. This is due to a range of internal and external limitations on the values political entrepreneurs derive from their political activities including the negative impact of greater visibility and scrutiny from media and political opposition. Also, the business model of political entrepreneurship is likely to be copied by business rivals, causing political rents to be shared or competed away. We also find that crises increase the value of political connections.

中文翻译：

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政治企业家和最高职位的危险


本案例研究研究了与政治有联系的企业家是否从他们的政治关系中受益。我们研究了 1980 年代初开始的受监管的泰国电信行业。我们研究了一位企业家转为政治家所拥有的电信公司，他于 2001 年升任首相，并于 2006 年被罢免。我们发展政治企业家及其政治生命周期的概念。我们表明，政治企业家的政治活动和关系的价值在这个生命周期中各不相同。政治企业家可能从与政客的非正式关系和在其生命周期早期不太明显的政治参与中受益更多，而升任更高级别的政治职位则不太可能使他们受益。这是由于政治企业家从其政治活动中获得的价值观受到一系列内部和外部限制，包括媒体和政治反对派提高知名度和审查的负面影响。此外，政治创业的商业模式很可能被商业竞争对手复制，导致政治租金被分享或竞争。我们还发现，危机增加了政治关系的价值。