It is often suggested that to make progress in consciousness science we need a theory of consciousness—one that tells us what consciousness is and what kinds of systems can have it. But this may be putting the cart before the horse. There are currently a wide range of very different theories all claiming to be theories of consciousness. How are we to decide between them if we do not already know which systems are conscious and what they are conscious of? In this paper I aim to do two things. First, I explain why a theory‐driven approach to consciousness science, even one sensitive to Lakatosian norms and updating in a Bayesian manner, may lead to divergence rather than convergence. Second, I draw on the history of thermometry and natural kind reasoning to sketch a theory‐neutral route towards progress in consciousness science.

中文翻译：

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意识科学中的自然类推理：理论测试的替代方案


人们经常认为，为了在意识科学方面取得进展，我们需要一种意识理论——一个告诉我们意识是什么以及什么样的系统可以拥有意识的理论。但这可能是本末倒置。目前有多种截然不同的理论都声称是意识理论。如果我们还不知道哪些系统是有意识的以及它们有意识的是什么，我们如何在它们之间做出决定？在本文中，我的目标是做两件事。首先，我解释为什么理论驱动的意识科学方法，即使是对拉卡托斯规范敏感并以贝叶斯方式更新的方法，也可能会导致分歧而不是趋同。其次，我借鉴测温和自然推理的历史，勾勒出一条通往意识科学进步的理论中立路线。