Much recent work in epistemology has concerned the relationship between the epistemic and the practical, with a particular focus on the question of how, if at all, practical considerations affect what we ought to believe. Two main positive accounts have been proposed: reasons pragmatism and pragmatic encroachment. According to reasons pragmatism, practical (including moral) considerations can affect what we ought to believe by constituting distinctively practical (i.e., non‐epistemic) reasons for or against belief. According to pragmatic encroachment, practical considerations bear on what we ought to believe by affecting epistemic justification (e.g. how much justification is required to justifiably believe). Both debates center around intuitive judgments about cases together with various principles involving reasons (or justification) and belief, with many contributors in the pragmatism and—to a lesser extent—encroachment debates helping themselves to talk of belief without saying much about what exactly they have in mind. There has also been a tendency to overlook potentially relevant distinctions among different kinds of reasons that have been drawn elsewhere. The goal of this paper is to argue that greater clarity and care concerning both reasons and belief is called for. Increased sensitivity to various subtleties will not only minimize the chances of unwittingly engaging in merely verbal disputes but also allow us to better navigate the pragmatism and encroachment debates.

中文翻译：

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 理由和信念


最近认识论方面的许多工作都关注认识论与实践之间的关系，特别关注实际考虑如何（如果有的话）如何影响我们应该相信的问题。提出了两个主要的积极解释：实用主义的原因和实用主义的侵犯。根据实用主义的理由，实践（包括道德）考虑可以通过构成支持或反对信仰的独特实践（即非认知）理由来影响我们应该相信的东西。根据实用主义的侵蚀，实际考虑通过影响认知论证（例如需要多少论证才能合理地相信）来影响我们应该相信什么。这两场辩论都围绕着对案件的直观判断以及涉及理由（或理由）和信仰的各种原则，许多实用主义的贡献者以及在较小程度上的侵犯性辩论帮助自己谈论信仰，而无需过多谈论他们到底拥有什么记住。人们还倾向于忽视其他地方提出的不同类型原因之间潜在的相关区别。本文的目的是论证需要对理由和信念更加清晰和谨慎。提高对各种微妙之处的敏感度不仅可以最大程度地减少无意中陷入口头纠纷的可能性，还可以让我们更好地应对实用主义和侵犯性辩论。