Why comply with epistemic norms? In this paper, I argue that complying with epistemic norms, engaging in epistemically responsible conduct, and being epistemically trustworthy are constitutive elements of maintaining good epistemic relations with oneself and others. Good epistemic relations are in turn both instrumentally and finally valuable: they enable the kind of coordination and knowledge acquisition underpinning much of what we tend to associate with a flourishing human life; and just as good interpersonal relations with others can be good for their own sake, standing in good epistemic relations is good for its own sake. On my account, we have reason to comply with epistemic norms because it is a way of respecting the final value of something that also tends to be an instrumentally valuable thing: good epistemic relations. Situating the account within the recent social turn in debates about epistemic instrumentalism, I argue that the dual‐value aspect of good epistemic relations can explain important anti‐instrumentalist intuitions, in a well‐motivated way, within a broadly instrumentalist framework.

中文翻译：

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认知规范性的关系基础


为什么要遵守认知规范？在本文中，我认为遵守认知规范、从事认知上负责任的行为以及认知上值得信赖是与自己和他人保持良好认知关系的构成要素。良好的认知关系反过来既具有工具性又具有最终价值：它们能够实现协调和知识获取，从而支撑我们倾向于与繁荣的人类生活联系在一起的大部分内容；正如与他人建立良好的人际关系本身就有益一样，保持良好的认知关系本身也是有益的。在我看来，我们有理由遵守认知规范，因为这是尊重某些事物最终价值的一种方式，而这种最终价值也往往是一种具有工具价值的东西：良好的认知关系。将这一解释置于最近有关认识工具主义辩论的社会转向中，我认为良好的认识关系的双重价值方面可以在广泛的工具主义框架内以一种有充分动机的方式解释重要的反工具主义直觉。