Let “phenomenal dogmatism” be the thesis that some experiences provide some beliefs with immediate prima facie justification, and do so purely in virtue of their phenomenal character. A basic question‐mark looms over phenomenal dogmatism: Why should the fact that a person is visited by some phenomenal feel suggest the likely truth of a belief? In this paper, I press this challenge, arguing that perceptually justified beliefs are justified not purely by perceptual experiences’ phenomenology, but also because we have justified second‐order background beliefs to the effect that the occurrence of certain perceptual experiences is indicative of the likely truth of certain corresponding beliefs. To bring this out, I contrast “perceptual dogmatism” with “moral dogmatism”: the thesis that some emotional experiences provide some moral beliefs with immediate prima facie justification, and do so purely in virtue of their phenomenal character. I argue that moral dogmatism is much less antecedently appealing, precisely because the counterpart second‐order beliefs here are much less plausible.

中文翻译：

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经验的局限性：教条主义和道德认识论


让“现象教条主义”成为这样的论点：某些经验为某些信念提供了直接的表面上的合理性，并且这样做纯粹是由于它们的现象特征。现象教条主义笼罩着一个基本的问号：为什么一个人受到某种现象感觉的影响就表明某种信念可能是真实的？在本文中，我提出了这一挑战，认为感知上合理的信念不仅是通过感知经验的现象学来证明的，而且还因为我们已经证明了二阶背景信念的合理性，即某些感知经验的发生表明了可能的结果。某些相应信念的真实性。为了阐明这一点，我将“感性教条主义”与“道德教条主义”进行了对比：这种观点认为，某些情感体验为某些道德信念提供了直接的表面上的理由，并且这样做纯粹是凭借其现象特征。我认为，道德教条主义在以前的吸引力要小得多，恰恰是因为这里对应的二阶信念不太可信。